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Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement
There is no antitrust law without antitrust law enforcement. Legal action
turns economic and jurisprudential theory into litigation, remedy, prohibition,
deterrence, and precedent that advance competition.
This Collection, Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, demonstrates that tools to
advance antitrust enforcement already exist, and they are well-suited to confront
today's U.S. antitrust challenges. The Features arrive at a critical moment, when
economic forces mirror the industrial concentration and economic inequality of
the turn of the twentieth century. Recall that the impetus for the creation of U.S.
antitrust laws was the growing power of Industrial Age trusts, combinations of
holdings within and across industries that dominated important economic sectors like oil, steel, and tobacco. Trusts exercised what reformers saw as outsized
political power, and they were blamed for the rise of economic inequality in the
early years of the twentieth century. Public outrage at their economic dominance
spurred the passage of the ShermanAct in 1890,' and, fueled by a decade of merger mania, the Clayton2 and Federal Trade Commission Acts' in 1914. One leading proponent of antitrust reform captured the prevailing mood when he warned
of the "gross inequality in the distribution of wealth and income which giant
corporations have fostered."'
Today, we see similar economic trends. The United States has a market
power problem; one that may well extend beyond individual markets to slow
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economic growth and widen economic inequality.' But there is also an arsenal of
antitrust-enforcement actions that can be used to preserve and garner the benefits of competition.
The nine Features in this Collection primarily focus on the efforts that can
be undertaken by the federal antitrust agencies: the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Together, these Features lay the foundation for an overarching enforcement
agenda, one written in the long, but receding, shadow of the Chicago School,
which brought economic analysis to the forefront of antitrust but failed to fully
capture the realities of competition and the private actions that can curb it. This
agenda can be implemented immediately, relying on the "dynamic potential" of
the antitrust laws, 6 which "evolve [] as circumstances change and learning
grows."'
Key to that learning is the discipline of economics. Each Feature includes an
economist author. Economic analysis lies at the center of antitrust analysis as an
indispensable tool for establishing harm or benefit from firms' actions. Though
the Chicago School relied on economics to criticize the antitrust rules of an earlier era, economic analysis should not be considered as synonymous with opposition to enforcement. The discipline of economics has developed many tools
that identify and measure anticompetitive conduct. Theories of collusion and
exclusion have developed in sophistication and variety since the founding of the
Chicago School. And advances in empirical methods since that time have allowed for careful and rigorous measurement of anticompetitive strategies. Economic tools are powerful and neutral and can be used for assessment of proposed
remedies and enforcement policies. When applied to anticompetitive acts, economic analysis will demonstrate the need for enforcement and indicate solutions. To that end, the authors in this Collection rely upon the modern economic
tools of game theory, empirical estimation, bargaining theory, and other techniques that can help courts determine where, and if, there is harm to competition. And, in so doing, this Collection illustrates three larger themes important
to the future of antitrust.8
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First, competitive harm today may arise from business arrangements far
more diverse than horizontal agreements reached between powerful, competing
sellers. Horizontal agreements have been too-often treated as the ground zero of
antitrust. In fact, competitive harms and exclusionary conduct can result from
any number of corporate arrangements, and this Collection contains several Features that illustrate the potential for such enforcement. The antitrust laws can be
applied to reach horizontal shareholding in a concentrated product market, as
demonstrated by Herbert Hovenkamp and Fiona Scott Morton,9 as well as rules
adopted by standards-setting organizations that are ineffective in preventing the
owners of standard-essential patents from exploiting the monopoly power they
gain from the creation of a standard that employs their patents, as explained by
Douglas Melamed and Carl Shapiro.10 Danger to competition may come, we are
told by Scott Hemphill and Nancy Rose, from buyers as well as sellers," and
from vertical contractual arrangements of the kind analyzed by Jonathan Baker
and Fiona Scott Mortonl2 and vertical mergers, which are discussed by Steven
Salop.
Second, we believe that the common-law approach to antitrust must always
reflect current economic theory and the facts at hand, even requiring a rethinking
of skeptical Supreme Court dicta. Scott Hemphill and Phillip Weiser show that
careful application of precedent would allow modern predation cases to escape
Brooke's Group's incredulity about the likelihood of predatory pricing, 14 and
Howard Shelanksi urges reexamination of Trinko's doubt about the ability of the
judiciary to fashion effective antitrust remedies in cases that present very different fact patterns from Trinko itself." At the same time, examination of new economic trends and business models reinvigorates, rather than deemphasizes, the
importance of treating market concentration as a critical starting point in antitrust analysis, 16 the issue on which Carl Shapiro and Herbert Hovenkamp focus,
while also reminding enforcers and courts alike that the customers in each
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properly-defined antitrust market deserve protection, a principle discussed by
Michael Katz and Jonathan Sallet.
Third, we call on antitrust enforcers to recognize that underenforcement will
not inevitably be corrected by the market. It is mistaken, for example, to expect
that a new firm will always enter to attack monopoly profits. " A dominant incumbent can use its profits to buy up small entrants, build entry barriers, or enlist a regulator's support to suppress rivalry. Concerns about the potential for
under-enforcement are growing. " It is therefore time - indeed past time - for a

reassessment of the assumption that markets will always, and in a timely way,
self-correct. For this reason, enforcers must be vigilant in their protection of the
competitive process. The Features in this Collection demonstrate several actions
by which enforcers could act against current forms of anticompetitive behavior
that have, in some cases, existed for many years without any self-correction
through the actions of private firms.
Concern that antitrust enforcement must be curbed today to avoid inevitable
over-enforcement ignores the practical threat of under-enforcement. As veterans
of antitrust agencies know, practical considerations influence how and which
cases are brought. Antitrust agencies must investigate and prosecute an enforcement action against a defendant that will counter the government's case by undermining the government's view of the law, economics, and evidence. The
agency must be confident both in its evidence and the match with relevant precedents to bring a case. To write a complaint that will be argued before a federal
judge entails a deep contemplation of what knowledge is needed to demonstrate
the necessity of enforcement and the nature of harm. Antitrust actions must be
defended in court as well as to the public, and given that the enforcer might lose,
enforcement is risky. This risk may discourage enforcers from bringing some
meritorious cases, and forces them to devote a substantial (and perhaps socially
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excessive) fraction of their limited resources to strengthening the cases they do
bring.
And yet there is no symmetric reminder of the risk of inaction; no judge that
scolds antitrust enforcement authorities after a cleared merger causes higher
prices or less innovation; and no court that chastises the government for declining to challenge exclusionary conduct harming competition. This inherent imbalance in risks motivates this Collection: without persistent and comprehensive
analysis of anticompetitive conduct in the economy, followed by action, enforcement will tend to be inadequate. In this Collection, we offer tools for enforcement that include detailed economic analysis, that are informed by experience,
new technologies, and data, that advance the sound evolution of the law, and
that are always anchored to the competitive realities of a controversy. Antitrust
has long been described as a common-law discipline;2 0 this Collection's ambition
is to demonstrate that antitrust enforcement can become more effective while
working with the core tenets of common-law logic and experience.2 1

20.

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 887, 899-900 (2007) ("From the
beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.").

21.

OW. HOLMES. JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic, it has
been experience.").

1920

